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Introduction	
What	is	medicine?	One	obvious	answer	is	that	medicine	is	the	business	of	curing	
sick	people.	Of	course	this	answer	would	need	to	be	qualified	to	handle	things	
like	cosmetic	surgery	and	sex	change	operations,	on	one	side,	and	to	handle	
palliative	care	and	supportive	treatment	on	the	other.	I’m	not	interested	in	these	
qualifications.	I’m	interested	in	the	kernel	idea:	that	medicine	is	basically	the	
business	of	curing	sick	people.	
The	trouble	with	this	idea	is	that	doctors	aren’t	very	good	at	curing	sick	people.	
Looking	at	the	various	medical	traditions	one	finds	through	history	and	across	
the	world,	the	curative	powers	of	these	traditions	ranges	from	mediocre	to	
awful.	
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Perhaps	the	point	of	medicine	is	indeed	to	cure:	perhaps	that	is	its	purpose.	This	
could	still	be	true	of	medicine,	as	a	hope,	albeit	glorious	or	forlorn—that	it	seeks	
to	heal	the	sick.	But	this	hope,	goal,	or	purpose	alone	cannot	define	medicine.	
Otherwise	even	my	most	misguided	and	uneducated	effort	to	improve	someone’s	
health	would	qualify	me	as	a	doctor.	If	we	want	to	understand	what	medicine	is,	
we	must	understand	what	distinguishes	professionals	from	well‐meaning	lay‐
persons,	as	well	as	quacks,	idiots	and	lunatics:	we	must	understand	the	core	
medical	competence.	Maybe	we	must	understand	other	things	too,	like	what	
health	and	disease	are;	much	has	been	written	on	that	topic	already.	But	in	this	
paper	I	try	to	answer	this	question:	what	is	the	core	medical	competence;	or,	if	
more	than	one,	what	are	they?	
In	the	critical	part	of	what	follows,	I	argue	that	we	cannot	say	that	cure	is	the	
core	medical	competence,	given	that	doctors	are	not	very	good	at	it.	We	cannot	
say	that	medicine	is	the	healing	art,	if	it	doesn’t	heal.		
Assuming	that	we	cannot	explain	the	entire	history	of	medicine	as	a	gigantic	
mixture	of	error	and	con‐artistry,	it	follows	that	the	medical	profession	must	
have	other	competencies,	besides	cure.	My	hypothesis	is	that	there	must	be	a	
core	medical	competence	that	distinguishes	medics	from	lawyers,	carpenters,	
and	so	forth.	
This	core	medical	competence,	if	it	exists,	is	not	the	same	thing	as	the	goal	of	
medicine.	They	might	be	related,	but	whether	they	are	related,	or	how,	is	not	my	
question.	Thus	my	question	is	not	answered	by	work	addressing	the	goals	of	
medicine.	Nor	is	my	question	the	same	as	asking	whether	this	or	that	skill	or	
characteristic	is	necessary	for	a	good	doctor.	For	example,	the	question	“Must	a	
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(good)	doctor	have	a	(good)	bedside	manner?”	is	not	quite	the	same	as	my	
question.	A	good	lawyer	might	also	need	a	good	bedside	manner.	I	am	seeking	a	
defining	feature,	one	that	distinguishes	doctors	from	others.	Thus	my	question	is	
not	answered	by,	for	example,	the	important volumes of work in bioethics on the 
physician-patient relationship.	
Medicine	is	a	field	with	both	an	intellectual	and	a	practical	dimension.	I	propose	
distinguishing	the	core	intellectual	competence	from	the	core	practical	(in	the	
modern	world,	clinical)	competence.	I	will	argue	that	the	core	intellectual	
competence	is	to	deliver,	or	at	least	exhibit,	understanding	of	our	maladies.	We	
might	desperately	want	a	cure,	but	we	accept	that	we	do	not	always	get	what	we	
want.	However,	we	will	not	call	someone	a	doctor	who	has	no	understanding	of	
illness.	I	will	argue	that	Mainstream	Medicine	is	limited	in	the	scope	of	
explanations	that	it	can	offer,	and	that	this	is	why	people	persist	in	consulting	
homeopaths,	sangomas,	and	a	multitude	of	other	practitioners	of	various	
disciplines,	usually	alongside	consulting	Mainstream	Medicine—much	to	the	
frustration	of	the	latter.	There	are	questions	that	Mainstream	Medicine	cannot	
answer,	even	if	it	does	have	better	curative	powers	than	other	traditions.		
On	this	basis,	I	will	argue	that	the	core	practical	competence	of	Mainstream	
Medicine	is	prediction.	The	ability	to	predict	is	our	central	empirical	test	for	
understanding.	One	can	understand	without	being	able	to	predict	and	vice	versa;	
nonetheless,	the	ability	to	reliably	make	accurate	predictions	is	a	good	piece	of	
evidence	for	understanding,	and	assertions	of	understanding	are	suspect	if	they	
are	not	accompanied	by	predictive	competence.	If	a	doctor	claims	to	understand	
a	malady	but	gets	the	prognosis	wholly	wrong,	we	doubt	them.	On	this	basis,	I	
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conclude	that	the	core	practical	medical	competence	is	not	cure,	but	prediction.	
We	might	want	cure	very	much,	but	we	do	not	necessarily	expect	it	from	a	
doctor.	We	do,	however,	expect	significant	predictive	abilities.	Again	I	suggest	
that	these	may	be	present	in	traditions	other	than	contemporary	Mainstream	
Medicine,	even	when	the	ability	to	cure	is	absent;	and	moreover,	that	the	ability	
to	predict	offers	a	field	of	empirical	study,	aside	from	the	well‐worn	testing	of	the	
effectiveness	of	interventions.	
1. The	Curative	Thesis	
I	am	going	to	label	the	idea	that	the	core	medical	competence	is	curing	sick	
people	the	Curative	Thesis.	By	“cure”,	I	do	not	mean	complete	restoral	to	health,	
as	if	the	affliction	had	never	afflicted.	That	would	make	the	Thesis	too	easy	to	
refute,	since	it	is	a	standard	to	which	medicine	very	rarely	attains.	I	mean	
something	more	modest:	I	am	happy	to	count	as	a	cure	any	intervention	that	is	
reasonably	effective	at	alleviating	the	ill‐effects	of	a	disease,	incapacity,	reduced	
lifespan,	and	suffering.	On	this	very	generous	definition	even	painkillers	count	as	
cures.	I	realise	that	is	a	bit	strange	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	usual	meaning	of	
“cure”,	but	dealing	with	pain	is	an	important	part	of	medicine,	both	in	its	own	
right	and	as	an	enabler	for	other	interventions,	especially	surgery.	So	I	want	to	
include	pain	relief,	along	with	any	reasonably	effective	intervention,	as	a	cure.	The	
emphasis	is	on	having	some	means	of	substantially	assisting	the	patient,	not	on	
the	complete	removal	of	the	disease;	and	I	certainly	don’t	want	to	enter	a	debate	
about	the	semantics	of	“cure”—indeed	I’m	trying	to	get	away	from	that	
conception	of	philosophy,	according	to	which	the	object	of	study	is	one’s	
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intuitions—that	is,	the	contents	of	one’s	own	head.	If	my	use	of	the	word	“cure”	
annoys	you,	pick	another	word.	
The	Curative	Thesis	is	the	claim	that	cure	is	the	core	medical	competence.	By	the	
latter	phrase,	I	mean	to	indicate	a	skill	or	skillset	that	is	characteristic	of	the	
medical.	It	need	not	be	possessed	by	every	practitioner:	it	could	be	distributed	
among	them,	and	in	contemporary	Mainstream	Medicine	there	is	clear	division	
of	labour.	Likewise,	it	need	not	correspond	with	the	overall	purpose	of	the	
profession.	No	doubt	we	want	cures	from	medicine,	but	the	Curative	Thesis	does	
not	state	this	plausible	claim.	It	makes	the	stronger	claim	that	the	ability	to	cure	
is	what	characterises	medicine.	This	is	the	claim	that	I	will	reject.	
2. Medicine	mostly	lacks	cures	
When	homo	sapiens	ran	out	of	space	and	resources	to	colonise,	about	10	000	
years	ago,	we	ceased	being	relatively	healthy	nomads	who	abandoned	our	
injured,	and	became	stationary	farmers	who	nurtured	their	sick.1	Both	medicine	
and	disease	as	we	know	it	were	born	then.	Anthropologists	identify	two	sick	
roles:	child‐like	and	outcast.	Before	we	settled,	the	outcast	was	probably	the	
dominant	role,	since	the	ability	to	move	was	essential	for	nomadic	groups.	Only	
after	we	settled	did	the	child	role	become	dominant	(though	not	universal:	think	
of	the	treatment	of	lepers).	The	sick	became	cared	for	more	commonly	than	
																																																								
1	This	paragraph	and	the	next	three	rely	heavily	on	Roy	Porter’s	grand	surveys	of	
this	history	of	medicine	(Porter	1997;	Porter	2002),	as	does	this	essay	as	a	
whole.	
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abandoned,	and	medical	traditions	became	more	sophisticated	and	more	
commonly	recorded.	
Disease	as	we	know	it	was	also	rare	before	we	settled.	Our	nomadic	ancestors	
suffered	injury	or	occasionally	anthrax	or	rabies.	But	the	infectious	diseases	we	
dread	require	large	groups	of	hosts,	and	we	neither	formed	nor	interacted	with	
such	pools	as	nomads.	As	farmers,	however,	we	collected	large	herds	of	animals,	
from	whom	many	of	our	infectious	diseases	come	(measles	from	dogs,	
tuberculosis	from	cattle,	flu	from	swine	and	poultry,	etc.).	We	also	gathered	into	
larger	settlements,	making	disease	reservoirs	of	ourselves,	and	we	altered	our	
environments	in	ways	that	provided	further	disease	reservoirs,	notably	by	
irrigating,	thus	creating	breeding	grounds	for	malarial	mosquitoes.	As	well	as	
infections,	we	became	prone	to	malnourishment	from	monotonous	and	un‐
nutritious	diets	based	on	a	single	staple	plant	(maize,	wheat,	potato,	rice,	etc.),	
perhaps	compounded	by	the	heavy	physical	labour	that	farming	without	
machines	requires.	Although	farming	supported	larger	populations,	these	
populations	were	less	healthy:	Paleolithic	skeletons	are	typically	a	few	
centimetres	shorter	than	their	Neolithic	descendants.	Like	philosophy,	it	seems,	
both	sickness	and	medicine	as	we	know	them	are	concomitants	of	civilisation.	
And,	like	philosophy,	medicine	has	not	been	very	good	at	providing	the	answers	
people	want.	It	has	not	been	very	good	at	delivering	cures.	
Consider	the	Western	learned	tradition	between	the	Renaissance	and	the	20th	
century.	This	tradition	has	its	roots	in	Ancient	Greece.	Greek	medicine	in	turn	
borrowed	elements	from	preceding	traditions,	notably	the	ancient	Egyptian.	
However,	it	quickly	took	its	own	direction.	It	was	distinctive	for	being	
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naturalistic,	seeking	natural	explanations	for	the	causes	of	illness.	It	also	
displayed	the	intellectual	openness	so	characteristic	of	ancient	Greek	culture.	
The	Greeks	did	not	perform	surgery,	due	partly	to	the	Hippocratic	injunction	to	
first	do	no	harm;	and	they	also	did	not	perform	human	autopsies,	which	limited	
the	degree	of	anatomical	knowledge	they	could	obtain.	This	changed	in	Europe	
during	the	Renaissance,	when	anatomical	knowledge	exploded	alongside	the	
sciences	and	the	visual	arts.	Understanding	of	anatomy	and	pathology	grew.	
Technological	developments	assisted,	for	example	the	development	of	optics	
permitting	the	manufacture	of	increasingly	powerful	and	cheap	microscopes.	
These	enabled	observation	of	creatures	far	smaller	than	anything	observable	by	
the	naked	eye,	and	allowed	the	formulation	and	testing	of	microbial	theories	of	
disease.	
Notwithstanding	the	progress	in	medical	understanding,	cures	remained	rare	
until	the	20th	century—even	bearing	in	mind	our	modest	meaning	of	“cure”.	
Focusing	on	the	late	18th	and	the	19th	centuries,	it	is	in	fact	quite	remarkable	to	
what	extent	medical	knowledge	grew,	without	a	corresponding	growth	in	the	
ability	to	do	more	than	sit	and	sympathetically	watch	the	patient	suffer,	as	in	
Luke	Fildes’	painting	The	Doctor,	painted	in	1891.	As	Porter	points	out,	the	tone	
of	the	work	is	not	critical	but	sympathetic.	Porter	writes:	
…before	the	twentieth	century,	the	pharmacopoeia	resembled	a	box	of	
blanks.	Of	the	thousands	of	medicaments	in	official	use,	few	were	truly	
effective…	and	doctors	knew	their	prescriptions	were	largely	eyewash.	
This	dismal	situation	was	somewhat	allayed	by	the	fact	that	churchgoing	
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folk	did	not	expect	the	family	doctor	to	perform	miracles	and,	living	in	a	
vale	of	tears,	they	were	inured	to	a	constant	round	of	funerals.	
(Porter	2002,	38–39)	
This	stark	assessment	rules	out	the	idea	that	the	ability	to	cure	is	the	
characteristic	competence	of	European	and	American	learned	medicine	in	the	
19th	Century.	In	a	lecture	delivered	in	1860,	the	Dean	of	the	Harvard	Medical	
School,	Oliver	Wendell	Holmes,	remarked:	“if	the	whole	materia	medica,	as	now	
used,	could	be	sunk	to	the	bottom	of	the	sea,	it	would	be	all	the	better	for	
mankind—and	all	the	worse	for	the	fishes.”	
What	about	other	traditions?	It	is	clear	that	other	traditions	contained	and	still	
contain	medical	knowledge.	I	will	talk	more	about	this	shortly.	However,	I	do	not	
think	there	is	evidence	to	support	the	claim	that	any	one	of	these	was	in	a	
substantially	better	position	than	Western	medicine	at	the	end	of	the	19th	
Century.	Maybe	some	had	more	cures,	maybe	not;	certainly	some	may	have	had	a	
healthier	worldview,	more	locally	appropriate	methods	for	preserving	health	
and	avoiding	disease,	and	so	forth.	But	as	far	as	reasonably	effective	interventions	
go,	I	do	not	believe	there	is	evidence	to	support	the	claim	that	any	tradition,	
either	the	Western	one	I	have	discussed,	or	any	other,	was	substantially	
curatively	superior	to	the	rest	at	that	time.	
The	20th	Century	brought	dramatic	changes	in	the	nature	of	medicine.	The	
number	of	cures	grew	substantially,	and	for	the	first	time	a	single	tradition	came	
to	have	global	presence,	for	which	reason	I	prefer	the	name	“Mainstream	
Medicine.”	It	is	probably	Mainstream	Medicine	that	has	the	strongest	claim	to	
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being	accurately	described	by	the	Curative	Thesis;	at	any	rate,	it	stakes	the	
loudest	claim,	taking	the	majority	of	government	resources	directed	at	health	the	
world	over.	Is	this	claim	justified?	In	contemporary	Mainstream	Medicine,	do	we	
finally	have	a	profession	whose	characteristic	competence	is	the	ability	to	cure	
disease?	
Strictly	speaking,	I	do	not	have	to	argue	this	point.	Even	if	Mainstream	Medicine	
is	uniquely	effective,	it	is	not	uniquely	medicine.	So	long	as	you	admit	that	
medicine	before	the	twentieth	century	was	indeed	medicine,	you	must	admit	
that	cure	is	not	the	core	medical	competence,	since	it	was	basically	absent.	
However,	I	do	want	to	deny	that	even	contemporary	Mainstream	Medicine	is	
characterised	by	its	ability	to	cure,	for	two	reasons.	First,	there	remain	many	
conditions	that	we	cannot	cure,	and	there	are	medical	specialities	in	these	areas	
nonetheless.	The	mere	existence	of	intractable	diseases	is	not	itself	enough	to	
show	that	the	competence	of	medicine	is	not	cure:	we	might	just	have	not	got	to	
those	diseases	yet.	However,	we	have	entire	disciplines	specialising	in	conditions	
for	which	we	have	no	cure:	entire	disciplines	whose	curative	arsenal	remains	a	
box	of	blanks.	
Consider	psychiatry.	Our	understanding	of	mental	illness	has	progressed	
somewhat	during	the	twentieth	century,	and	we	have	some	skills	for	handling	
the	mentally	ill.	However,	foundational	debates	remain	(Kendler	and	Parnas	
2012).	The	classification	of	mental	illnesses	is	regularly	revised	and	each	time	
the	revision	is	hotly	debated.	For	many	disorders,	there	are	significant	bodies	of	
opinion	holding	that	they	are	either	some	other	disorder	or	not	a	disorder	at	all.	
Comorbidity	between	disorders	abounds	(van	Loo	et	al.	2013;	van	Loo	and	
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Romeijn	2015).	Agreement	on	the	correct	treatment	exists	only	within	schools	
which	tend	to	disagree	vehemently	with	each	other.	In	psychiatry,	we	have	not	
moved	far	from	the	position	that	the	whole	of	medicine	was	in	before	the	
twentieth	century,	which	Roy	Porter	calls	“therapeutic	nihilism:	medicine	could	
understand	the	diseases	from	which	people	would	die	but	not	stop	them	from	
dying”(Porter	2002,	39).	Suicide	is	a	top	ten	killer	in	most	developed	nations.	
Psychiatry	is	arguably	a	special	case.	But	there	are	many	other	examples.	
Consider	orthopaedics	as	applied	to	the	spine.	It	has	plenty	of	interventions,	but	
the	effectiveness	of	these	interventions	for	dealing	with	common	and	debilitating	
problems	like	herniated	discs	is	extremely	doubtful.	When	I	slipped	a	disc	two	
years	ago,	the	surgeon	himself	advised	me	to	avoid	surgery.	Or	think	of	mundane	
ailments	like	the	common	cold.	For	reasons	we	understand	very	well,	we	cannot	
do	much	about	the	common	cold,	either	by	way	of	vaccination	or	treatment.	Or	
think	of	disciplines	concerned	with	very	serious	illnesses,	disciplines	like	
oncology	and	cardiology.	Do	not	be	fooled	by	regular	news	of	breakthroughs:	our	
abilities	to	cure—to	effectively	intervene	upon—cancer	and	heart	disease	
remain	extremely	limited.	Despite	unimaginable	resources	being	poured	into	
research	for	cures,	these	diseases	continue	to	be	among	the	leading	global	killers.	
Besides	this	rather	casual	argument,	I	appeal	to	an	extended	argument	by	Jacob	
Stegenga,	who	argues	that	the	success	of	medicine	in	the	first	part	of	the	20th	
century	at	identifying	“magic	bullets”	has	not	continued,	and	that	modern	
medical	interventions	tend	to	be	relatively	ineffective	by	comparison	(Stegenga,	
n.d.).	Ironically,	the	growing	sophistication	of	medical	research	has	enabled	us	to	
detect	smaller	effect	sizes:	better	science	enables	us	to	find	worse	cures.	Also	
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ironically,	the	increasing	complexity	of	medical	research	makes	methods	more	
“malleable”,	and	also	makes	them	more	costly,	opening	the	door	wider	to	
financial	influence:	a	situation	where	better	methods	enable	worse	science.	
On	the	basis	of	his	extended	methodological	critique,	Stegenga	argues	for	
medical	nihilism:	“the	view	that	we	should	have	little	confidence	in	the	
effectiveness	of	medical	interventions”	(Stegenga,	n.d.).	I	am	impressed	by	his	
criticisms	of	medical	research,	but	I	do	not	follow	Stegenga	all	the	way	to	the	
conclusion	he	draws	from	that	powerful	critique.	It	seems	to	me	that	therapeutic	
nihilism	(as	Porter	calls	it)	is	indeed	warranted	in	some	fields,	since	some	fields	
are	indeed	therapeutic	failures.	Stegenga	defines	medical	nihilism	so	that	it	just	
is	therapeutic	nihilism.	But	this	is	only	a	legitimate	definition	if	cure	is	the	central	
medical	competence:	the	competence	that	distinguishes	the	doctor	from	the	
blacksmith.	If	one	does	not	accept	this,	then	one	is	not	compelled	to	adopt	
nihilism	about	the	whole	of	medicine	merely	because	it	is	not	very	good	at	
curing.		
I	expect	Stegenga	would	agree	that	there	are	other	medical	competences	besides	
cure.	In	that	case,	even	if	therapeutic	nihilism	is	warranted,	medical	nihilism	is	
only	warranted	on	the	assumption	that	the	core	medical	competence	is	the	
ability	to	cure.	It	is	only	by	identifying	the	success	of	medicine	with	its	ability	to	
cure	that	a	survey	of	medicine’s	curative	failures	can	lead	us	to	conclude	that	
medicine	itself	is	a	failure.	And	I	do	not	share	the	assumption	that	the	core	
medical	competence	is	curative.	On	the	contrary,	I	believe	that	the	virtual	
absence	of	cure	from	the	majority	of	medical	practice,	taken	across	time	and	
place,	means	that	there	must	be	some	other	competence	that	characterises	the	
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medical	profession—that	distinguishes	doctors	from	other	professionals.	Thus	I	
take	Stegenga	to	have	made	a	strong	case	for	therapeutic	nihilism,	but	to	have	
mis‐defined	medical	nihilism	to	be	identical	with	it.	I	do	not	take	issue	here	with	
his	therapeutic	nihilism,	but	I	seek	a	way	out	of	medical	nihilism,	by	seeking	
other	things	that	medical	professionals	may	do	well,	besides	cure.	
3. Medicine	provides	understanding	even	when	it	cannot	cure	
What	else	might	doctors	be	good	for,	if	not	curing	the	sick?	What	other	special	
skills	might	they	have?	Medicine	is	a	complex	discipline	with	both	an	intellectual	
and	a	practical	aspect.	I	want	to	distinguish	these	two	aspects,	corresponding	to	
intellectual	and	practical	competence	respectively.	In	this	section,	I	will	argue	
that	the	core	intellectual	competence	of	medicine	is	to	deliver	understanding.		
It	seems	to	me	that	medicine	is	an	intellectual	endeavour	as	well	as	a	practical	
one.	When	medicine	cannot	cure	us,	it	may	still	provide	understanding	of	our	
maladies,	or	at	least	vicarious	understanding	through	the	assurance	that	they	are	
understood	by	someone:	a	division	of	epistemic	labour	(Thoma	2015).	This	is	an	
aspect	of	medicine	that	the	Curative	Thesis	completely	suppresses,	since	cure	is	
a	thoroughly	practical	matter.	If	the	Curative	Thesis	were	true,	the	only	
significance	of	understanding	would	be	its	potential	for	leading	to	cure.	
In	this	section	I	will	suggest	that	demonstrating	understanding	is	what	gives	us	
confidence	in	a	medical	professional	even	when	they	cannot	cure.	In	the	next	
section	I	will	suggest	that	it	is	also	the	search	for	understanding	that	drives	
people	to	consult	a	range	of	traditions;	they	are	not	merely	tempted	by	the	
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prospect	of	a	cure,	but	by	the	prospect	of	making	sense	of	things,	and	answer	
questions	that	Mainstream	Medicine	simply	cannot	frame.		
Consider	a	case	where	a	medical	professional	is	unable	to	cure,	but	is	considered	
a	competent	medical	professional	nonetheless.	Suppose	you	have	a	sore	finger.	
The	doctor	recognises	the	disease	and	gives	you	a	detailed	explanation	of	what	is	
going	on.	She	regrets	that	she	can	do	nothing,	but	tells	you	that	in	three	days	it	
will	turn	green,	and	then	fall	off	two	days	after	that.	
Here	we	have	a	case	of	ineffective	medicine.	Nonetheless,	we	could	still	have	a	
case	of	medicine.	We	do	not	doubt	the	competence	of	the	medical	profession	as	a	
whole,	or	the	particular	persons	involved	in	this	case,	merely	because	the	finger	
cannot	be	saved.	Of	course,	we	might	be	surprised	and	seek	second	and	third	
opinions,	to	make	sure	that	our	doctor	is	competent.	But	assuming	that	they,	and	
the	internet,	all	agree,	we	can	accept	that	this	is	a	competent	doctor,	with	a	
competent	medical	opinion	about	this	particular	ailment,	perhaps	even	an	expert	
about	this	particular	class	of	ailments	(maybe	even	mentioned	in	a	Wikipedia	
article)—who,	nonetheless,	is	unable	to	save	the	finger.		
What	makes	this	a	competent	medical	opinion?	The	fact	that	the	doctor	
understands	what	is	going	on.	She	can	explain	what	is	happening	to	the	finger.	
(Perhaps	she	can	also	explain	why	she	cannot	cure	it:	one	can	explain	why	one	
cannot	do	something,	as	when	a	physicist	explains	why	she	cannot	build	a	rocket	
that	travels	at	light	speed.)	In	a	case	like	this,	the	patient’s	health	may	be	little	
better	off	before	he	sought	medical	help.	What	he	has	obtained	is	not	cure,	but	
some	degree	of	understanding.	
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Of	course,	he	may	not	even	have	obtained	the	high	degree	of	understanding	that	
the	doctor	has.	Often,	patients	do	not	understand	what	is	wrong	with	them	in	any	
great	detail.	Nonetheless,	he	has	obtained	some	degree	of	understanding,	if	only	
that	an	uncurable	bug	with	a	certain	name	has	attacked	his	finger.	This	is	a	sort	
of	vicarious	understanding,	the	assurance	that	somebody	else	understands	what	
is	going	on	with	his	finger.	This,	in	my	view,	is	still	a	kind	of	understanding—
sufficient	for	the	purpose	at	hand,	and	indeed	the	only	understanding	that	most	
of	us	ever	have	of	almost	any	matter	outside	of	our	own	tiny	areas	of	modest	
expertise.2	
It	is	small	consolation	to	go	to	the	doctor	seeking	a	cure,	and	come	away	with	
only	understanding.	But	I	am	not	arguing	that	understanding	is	what	we	want	
from	medicine.	I	am	arguing	it	is	what	we	get:	it	is	what	medicine	is	competent	to	
deliver.	Actually,	we	get	a	bit	more	than	that:	in	the	next	section	I	will	argue	that	
we	get	predictions	about	our	health,	and	about	the	consequences	of	various	
possible	courses	of	action.	Before	that,	let	me	present	another	argument	that	
medicine	provides	understanding	even	when	it	does	not	provide	cure,	and	
moreover	that	we	place	value	on	this	understanding.	
																																																								
2	The	possibility	of	this	sort	of	knowledge	is	an	epistemological	topic	in	its	own	
right;	but	the	general	consensus	is	that	some	sort	of	reliance	upon	testimony	and	
also	upon	expertise	must	be	possible,	unless	we	are	all	much	more	ignorant	than	
we	take	ourselves	to	be,	given	the	extent	of	our	reliance	on	testimony	in	general	
and	expert	testimony	in	particular.	For	the	state	of	the	art	in	this	field	see	
(Gelfert	2014).	
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4. What	Mainstream	Medicine	cannot	explain	
In	South	Africa,	a	vibrant	traditional	healing	practice	persists.	This	is	not	merely	
because	the	number	of	Mainstream	doctors	per	capita	is	low.	Often,	people	will	
consult	both	a	Mainstream	doctor	and	a	sangoma.	Estimates	suggest	that	
anything	from	60%	to	80%	of	the	population	consult	sangomas,	despite	the	fact	
that	the	tradition	sits	uneasily	with	conservative	African	Christianity,	is	derided	
by	Mainstream	Medicine,	and,	arguably,	is	seriously	misrepresented	in	
legislation	attempting	to	regulate	it	(Thornton	2009).	Moreover,	this	is	not	poor	
man’s	medicine:	sangomas	may	charge	comparable	fees	to	Mainstream	doctors;	
and	indeed	many	people	will	consult	sangomas	in	conjunction	with	consulting	a	
Mainstream	doctor.	All	of	this	is	hard	to	explain	if	sangomas	are	thought	of	as	a	
sort	of	African	version	of	a	Mainstream	doctor,	with	the	same	set	of	goals	but	a	
different	set	of	tools.	
Indeed,	it	appears	that	this	is	not	the	right	way	to	think	about	sangomas.	As	
Robert	Thornton	puts	it,	“sangomas…	are	neither	particularly	traditional	nor	
healers	as	these	terms	are	usually	used”	(Thornton	2009,	31).3	Their	practice	is	a	
live	one,	that	cannot	be	“relegated	to	the	past”	(Thornton	2009,	32);	and	it	is	
moreover	not	solely	concerned	with	healing,	as	that	is	understood	in	Mainstream	
																																																								
3	I	rely	on	Thornton’s	account	here	because	it	is	concise	and	reasonably	general	
to	the	whole	of	South	Africa,	as	well	as	reasonably	recent.	For	an	older,	regionally	
specific	account	that	is	much	richer,	see	(Ngubane	1977).	Ngubane	emphasises	
the	many	translation	failures	between	Zulu	and	English	medical	terms	and	
concepts.	
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Medicine.	This	suggests	that	sangomas	persist	in	South	Africa	alongside	
Mainstream	Medicine	at	least	in	part	because	sangomas	perform	a	function	that	
Mainstream	doctors	cannot.	I’m	not	denying	that	there	may	be	other	reasons	too,	
nor	indeed	that	the	ability	to	cure	various	afflictions	may	be	one	of	them.	My	
interest	is	in	examining	whether	there	are	kinds	of	understanding	which	the	
sangoma	offers	that	the	Mainstream	doctor	cannot.	
Consider	Thornton’s	account	of	divination:	
This	practice	involves	the	release	from	cupped	hands	of	a	set	of	objects	
(tinhlolo)	onto	a	grass	mat	that	is	situated	between	the	diviner	and	the	
client.	…When	these	are	thrown	onto	the	mat,	the	objects	land	in	a	
configuration	that	is	‘read’	through	a	rhythmic	verbal	interaction	between	
client	and	healer	concerning	the	meanings	of	the	tinhlolo.	A	diagnosis	or	
possible	solution	to	the	problem	that	is	being	addressed	gradually	
emerges	through	the	interaction	between	client,	healer	and	the	pattern	of	
the	objects.	
(Thornton	2009,	24)	
There	is	a	clear	suggestion	of	inquiry,	and	moreover	shared	inquiry,	the	object	of	
which	is	understanding.	Thornton	says	that	clients	expect	to	receive	“a	diagnosis,	
advice,	or	herbal	remedies	as	a	result”	(2009,	24).	Diagnosis	is	not	curative;	the	
object	obtained	is	understanding.	Advice	itself	is	not	curative,	although	it	may	
direct	a	course	of	action	that	is	curative,	preventive,	or	neither.	Herbal	remedies	
may	initially	be	construed	curatively.	However,	this	is	not	so	clear	on	closer	
inspection.	
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According	to	Thornton,	herbal	remedies	are	not	typically	intended	to	be	
pharmacologically	active,	as	one	would	assume	from	the	perspective	of	
Mainstream	Medicine:	
Most	of	these	are	not	used	as	pharmacological	agents,	but	rather	used	in	a	
ritual	or	for	steam	or	smoke	baths,	inhaled	as	smoke	or	steam,	applied	as	
rubs,	or	worn	as	amulets.	Herbs	may	be	ingested	orally,	vaginally,	anally	
via	enemas,	or	through	small	cuts	in	the	skin,	but	whatever	the	
pharmacological	activity	the	original	herb	might	have	(or	might	have	had)	
is	often	not	the	goal	or	rationale	of	the	treatment.	Since	there	is	no	
standardization	of	collection,	drying,	storage	or	other	treatment	of	herbs	
and	other	‘medicinal’	products,	much	of	their	chemical	activity	is	lost,	
modified,	or	otherwise	transformed.	In	any	case,	this	is	rarely	the	point.	
(Thornton	2009,	25)		
Thornton’s	account	brings	out	the	crassness	of	simply	assuming	that	the	
sangoma	is	an	African	version	of	the	Mainstream	Medic	with	a	different	set	of	
tools.	It	also	brings	out	the	centrality	of	understanding	in	the	tradition	of	the	
sangoma.	Thornton	argues	that	legislation	wrongly	restricts	the	sangoma	to	
weak	medicine	and	social	work,	when	“This	is	certainly	not	the	vision	of	most	
healers,	who	seem	to	understand	themselves	as	belonging	to	an	intellectual	
tradition	of	which	healing	is	just	one	part”	(Thornton	2009,	23).	
Accepting,	then,	that	the	sangoma	is	not	wholly	engaged	in	trying	to	heal,	and	at	
least	partly	engaged	in	trying	to	offer	or	attain	understanding,	what	are	the	
questions	that	the	sangoma	can	answer	that	the	Mainstream	Medic	cannot?	
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Philosophers	of	science	disagree	about	the	nature	of	both	understanding	and	
explanation,	and	the	relation	between	them.	However,	most	agree	that	
understanding	is	not	just	a	feeling,	but	must	also	involve	the	grasping	of	an	
explanation	(which,	in	turn,	is	not	defined	merely	as	something	that	produces	
understanding).	And	most	accept	that	there	are	different	kinds	of	explanation,	at	
least	on	the	surface,	even	if	one	is	in	fact	the	“deep”	or	“underlying”	kind.	
One	common	kind	of	explanation	is	contrastive	causal	explanation.	Consider	a	
question	like	“Why	did	you	arrive	late?”	A	causal	explanation	supplies	
information	about	the	causal	history	of	the	event	being	explained	(Lewis	1986).	
Usually,	this	means	identifying	a	cause	of	that	event.4	But	there	are	many	causes	
of	your	late	arrival,	including	some	very	irrelevant	ones,	like	the	presence	of	
oxygen,	the	birth	of	your	great	grandmother,	and	indeed	the	Big	Bang.5	A	
contrastive	explanation	answers	a	contrastive	question,	such	as	“Why	did	you	
arrive	late	rather	than	on	time?”		The	two	go	together	nicely,	because	many	
ordinary	explanations	do	seem	to	cite	causes,	but	ordinary	events	have	far	too	
																																																								
4	The	main	exception	is	the	case	where	an	absence	is	cited	in	explanation:	“Your	
plant	died	because	you	did	not	water	it.”	However	this	is	only	an	exception	for	
those	who	believe	that	absences	cannot	be	causal,	which	is	not	everybody	(Lewis	
2004;	Schaffer	2005).		
5	Some	philosophers	deny	that	these	events	are	all	causes.	However,	they	are	in	a	
minority;	moreover,	they	typically	argue	that	causes	themselves	ought	to	be	
understood	contrastively,	so	the	point	does	not	matter	for	present	purposes.	See:	
(Schaffer	2005;	Menzies	2007;	Broadbent	2009;	Schaffer	2010;	Broadbent	2012)	
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many	causes	for	them	all	to	count	as	informative	explanations.	To	provide	a	good	
contrastive	causal	explanation,	I	must	cite	a	causal	difference	between	the	
history	of	the	fact	and	the	history	of	the	foil	with	which	it	is	contrasted	(Lipton	
2004,	42).	The	birth	of	your	grandmother	does	not	count	since	she	is	born	in	the	
case	where	you	arrive	late	and	the	case	where	you	arrive	on	time.	However,	your	
tarrying	to	knock	back	another	glass	of	sherry	when	you	should	have	been	filing	
into	the	auditorium	is	a	cause	of	your	late	arrival	and	a	difference	from	the	case	
where	you	arrive	on	time.	
Both	Mainstream	Medics	and	sangomas	explain	facts	about	human	health	and	
disease,	and	it	seems	to	be	that	both	explain	causally	(even	if	not	all	the	causes	
are	natural).	I	suggest,	however,	that	sangomas	can	countenance	contrasts	that	
cannot	be	framed	by	Mainstream	Medicine.	The	latter	has	its	roots	in	the	
Renaissance,	and	it	treats	the	Vitruvian	Man:	an	individual	physical	human	body,	
virtually	filling	the	universe.	It	thus	provides	excellent	explanations	of	what	goes	
on	inside	the	individual	physical	human	body,	and	virtually	no	explanations	of	
anything	else.	
For	critiques	of	Mainstream	Medicine	that	turn	on	this	point,	we	do	not	need	to	
change	cultures;	we	do	not	even	need	leave	the	domain	of	the	medical	sciences.	
Social	epidemiologists	like	Michael	Marmot	and	Nancy	Krieger	argue	that	one	
cannot	explain	disease	inequalities	between	populations	without	considering	
social	causes	(Brunner	and	Marmot	2006;	Marmot	2006;	Krieger	2007;	Krieger	
2011).	In	other	words,	they	argue	that	Mainstream	Medicine	cannot	explain	
differences	between	the	health	of	the	wealthy	and	the	poor,	black	and	white,	
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Northern	and	Southern,	and	so	on.	These	contrasts	simply	are	not	framed	within	
Mainstream	Medicine;	so	it	cannot	answer	questions	about	them.	
In	similar	vein,	a	number	of	historians	have	argued	that	medicine	is	not	the	most	
important	factor	in	explaining	increases	in	longevity	in	developed	nations	(e.g.	
McKeown	1976;	Wootton	2006).	In	this	case,	the	argument	is	that	the	causal	
difference	between	the	way	we	are	and	the	way	we	were	is	not	Mainstream	
Medicine.	This	suggests	(though	does	not	imply)	that	the	causal	difference	is	also	
not	to	be	located	within	the	panoply	of	causes	that	Mainstream	Medicine	can	cite.	
Similarly,	epidemiologists	generally	concur	that	state	expenditure	on	healthcare	
is	neither	the	most	effective	nor	the	most	efficient	way	to	improve	the	health	of	a	
population:	education	and	employment	are	far	more	important.	Again,	these	are	
not	the	kind	of	cause	that	Mainstream	Medicine	deals	with.	
The	strategy	of	obtaining	detailed	anatomical	and	pathological	knowledge	has	
been	effective	for	developing	cures	for	the	individual	given	theoretically	limitless	
resources.	But	it	has	made	it	hard	for	many	of	us	to	see	that	cures	are	only	one	
way	to	manage	health.	It	has	distorted	health	policy	the	world	over	by	diverting	
disproportionate	resources	into	medicine,	at	the	expense	of	supporting	or	even	
recognising	the	significance	for	health	of	other	societal	parameters	within	
political	control.	It	has	set	the	expectations	of	citizens	on	a	trajectory	that	is	
already	unaffordable	for	many,	and	will	become	less	affordable,	not	more.	These	
are	not	technical	faults,	but	conceptual	ones.	I	am	not	rubbishing	the	practice	or	
the	capacities	of	Mainstream	Medicine.	I	am	rubbishing	its	worldview.	
If	there	is	discontent	about	the	scope	of	Mainstream	Medicine	even	within	the	
medical	sciences,	it	is	not	surprising	that	traditions	outside	it	should	offer	
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explanations	of	things	that	escape	its	purview.	Other	traditions	of	healing,	
including	those	found	in	Africa,	see	both	the	causation	of	disease	and	the	nature	
of	disease	in	a	way	that	is	not	limited	to	the	individual	human	body,	but	may	
include	the	social	world,	the	body	politic,	and	the	spiritual	realm.	This	is	evident	
in	the	account	of	divination	just	offered.	
Here	let	me	address	a	point	that	will	be	bothering	some	of	you.	Some	of	you	will	
be	rolling	their	eyes,	either	secretly	or	openly,	at	the	idea	of	a	spiritual	
explanation	of	disease.	If	that	is	you,	please	do	not	let	the	word	“spiritual”	
trouble	you	too	much.	My	point	is	that	Mainstream	Medicine	cannot	offer	any	
explanations	to	any	questions	about	anything	that	does	not	originate	in,	enter,	
leave,	or	operate	on	the	internal	workings	of	the	physical	body.	There	is	a	lot	
more	fitting	this	description	than	the	spiritual	in	which	you,	as	a	good	naturalist,	
do	not	believe.	Consider	diseases	that	are	socially	caused	or	socially	constituted.	
Even	the	most	ardent	naturalist	can	countenance	the	plausible	claim	that	the	
prevalence	(and	comorbidity)	of	depression	and	anxiety	in	many	developed	
societies	either	has	a	social	cause	or	is	a	social	construct	(Kendler	and	Parnas	
2012;	van	Loo	et	al.	2013;	van	Loo	and	Romeijn	2015).	Perhaps	society	makes	us	
miserable	and	worried,	being	ill‐fitted	to	our	hardwiring.	Or	perhaps	the	idea	
that	misery	and	fear	are	problematic	is	itself	the	problem;	perhaps	a	clearer	
understanding	would	just	accept	that	we	are	a	miserable	and	fearful	bunch.	The	
idea	that	a	disease	can	be	caused	by	something	non‐biological,	and	that	it	can	
even	be	something	that	is	not	biological,	is	well‐rehearsed:	think	of	the	now‐
defunct	affliction,	female	hysteria.	Thus	one	does	not	need	to	adhere	to	any	
particular	spiritual	belief	system	to	accept	that	there	are	explanations	of	disease	
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that	it	is	legitimate	to	offer,	and	understandings	that	it	is	legitimate	to	seek,	that	
do	not	fall	within	the	scope	of	Mainstream	Medicine.	Hence	one	does	not	have	to	
endorse	the	corresponding	spiritual	belief	system	to	accept	that	a	sangoma	
might	well	be	able	to	help	a	client	reach	an	understanding	of	things	that,	in	their	
location	or	operation,	are	outside	scope	of	Mainstream	Medicine.	
I	have	argued	that	Mainstream	Medicine	offers	explanations	even	when	it	does	
not	offer	cures,	and	that	it	is	this,	not	curative	ability,	that	still	characterises	
some	entire	areas	of	Mainstream	Medicine	and	the	grip	that	Mainstream	
Medicine	has	on	many	diseases.	I	have	also	argued	that	the	persistence	of	other	
traditions	alongside	Mainstream	Medicine	is	in	part	explained	by	the	fact	that	
these	traditions	may	offer	understanding	of	things	that	are	simply	outside	of	the	
scope	of	Mainstream	Medicine.	What	of	complete	alternatives	to	Mainstream	
Medicine?	
Homeopathy	is	perhaps	the	most	striking	of	these.	Since	its	inception	it	has	been	
explicitly	critical	of	the	tenets	of	Mainstream	Medicine,	which	it	calls	“allopathic”.	
Homeopathy	advocates	a	principle	that	may	be	roughly	characterised	as	“like	
healing	like”.	It	is	the	subject	of	fierce	debates	in	the	UK	and	USA,	though	much	
less	so	in	South	Africa—indeed	it	is	taught	at	South	African	universities,	which	is	
very	surprising	to	British	and	American	academics.	I’m	not	going	to	enter	into	
those	debates,	but	I	want	to	suggest	that	the	idea	that	medicine	offers	
understanding	may	also	explain	some	of	the	appeal	alternatives	such	as	
homeopathy.	Dissatisfaction	with	the	ability	of	Mainstream	Medicine	to	answer	
questions	that	one	wants	answered	will	naturally	leads	one	to	reject	its	
worldview.	The	most	irritating	critics	of	homeopathy	are	those	who	see	its	
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practitioners	as	con‐artists	and	its	clients	and	dupes.	They	are	irritating	because	
they	miss	the	real	driver	for	many	of	those	involved	in	homeopathy,	as	well	as	in	
much	of	the	“New	Age”	movement,	which	is	a	sense	of	dissatisfaction	with	the	
paradigm	of	Mainstream	Medicine.	Thomas	Kuhn	used	homeopathy	as	an	
example	of	a	different	paradigm	,	and	advisedly	so.	One	need	not	accept	a	
paradigm	to	recognise	the	crisis	within	the	dominant	paradigm	that	makes	it	
attractive	to	seek	alternatives.	
I’m	not	going	to	explore	this	point	in	any	detail.	I	mention	it	merely	to	suggest	
that	the	search	for	understanding	can	explain	both	why	systems	might	persist	in	
parallel,	and	why	they	might	be	offered	as	alternatives	to	each	other.	The	fact	it	
can	explain	these	phenomena	provides	us	with	a	reason	to	think	that	it	is	true:	
that	medicine	does	offer	understanding	of	sickness,	even	when	it	does	not	offer	
cure,	and	that	we	value	the	understanding	it	offers.	
5. The	core	practical	competence	is	prediction	
I	have	argued	that	understanding	is	the	core	intellectual	competence	of	
medicine.	In	this	section	I	argue	that	the	core	practical	competence	of	medicine	
is	the	ability	to	make	predictions	about	health	and	disease.	
The	two	are	connected,	because	a	central	piece	of	evidence	for	understanding	is	
predictive	ability.	Consider	again	the	case	of	the	doctor	who	diagnoses	a	poorly	
finger.	The	plausibility	of	the	proffered	explanation,	and	of	the	doctor’s	claim	to	
understand	what	is	going	on,	is	hugely	bolstered	by	the	fact	that	the	predictions	
she	makes	come	true.	Conversely,	if	they	do	not,	the	claim	to	understanding	is	
weakened.	This	is	easily	seen	with	more	realistic	examples.	If	you	have	high	
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cholesterol,	the	cardiologist	will	be	able	to	tell	you	that	your	risk	of	heart	disease	
is	higher,	but	not	whether	you	will	have	a	heart	attack	in	five	years,	nor	whether	
taking	statins	will	prevent	a	heart	attack,	nor	even	whether	a	dietary	
modification	will	successfully	lower	your	cholesterol.6	All	these	things	suggest	
that	we	do	not	understand	the	role	of	cholesterol	in	heart	disease	very	well;	and	
indeed	we	do	not.	
Predictive	ability	is	particular	important	when	relying	on	an	expert.	A	layperson	
cannot	hope	to	assess	the	competence	of	an	expert	against	their	own	theoretical	
knowledge,	and	will	often	lack	reliable	testimonies,	which	in	any	case	must	
collectively	be	based	on	something	other	than	testimony.	Thus	the	primary	way	
that	the	layperson	(or	laypeople,	as	a	group)	can	lay	hands	on	the	competence	of	
the	expert	is	through	their	predictive	competence.	If	the	medic	predicts	
accurately	that	the	finger	will	become	swollen	in	a	certain	timeframe,	then	
become	gangrenous	at	a	later	time,	and	that	it	will	turn	a	certain	colour,	that	it	
will	or	will	not	cause	pain,	that	certain	sensations	will	be	experienced,	and	so	
forth,	then	their	diagnosis	will	be	credible.	Prognosis	is	a	test	of	diagnosis:	not	
the	only	one,	but	an	important	one	nonetheless.	
My	proposal,	then,	is	that	prediction	is	the	core	practical	competence	of	
medicine.	I	have	given	independent	reasons	for	thinking	that	understanding	is	
something	that	we	want	from	medicine,	and	prediction	is	the	main	empirical	
handle	we	have	on	understand.	I	have	two	further	reasons	for	thinking	that	
																																																								
6	This	point	is	due	to	Jacob	Stegenga	(private	correspondence).	
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prediction	is	the	core	practical	medical	competence,	and	that	it	is	importantly	
prior	to	the	ability	to	cure,	which	is	also	a	practical	competence.	
First,	as	is	already	apparent,	the	history	of	medicine	exhibits	predictive	
competence	long	before	curative	abilities.	I	have	argued	this	point	already	in	
respect	of	Western	medicine	before	the	twentieth	century,	and	will	not	restate	
the	case	here.	But	looking	deeper	into	the	history	of	medicine,	and	more	broadly	
at	its	present	manifestations,	we	see	predictive	competence	as	an	expectation	of	
healers	in	many	traditions.	The	sangoma	practice	of	divination	is	an	example:	
one	kind	of	question	one	can	ask	is	what	is	going	to	happen,	or	likely	to	happen,	
so	as	to	enable	one	to	prepare	better.	There	are	plenty	of	others.	Ancient	
Egyptians	expected	treatment	and	prophecy	from	the	same	group	of	specialists.	
Many	ancient	traditions,	as	well	as	contemporary	shamanistic	traditions,	see	
prediction	as	tangled	up	with	medicine.	So	there	is	a	deep	presence	of	prediction	
within	medicine,	aside	from	the	very	practical	significance	that	I	have	
emphasised	as	the	signature	of	understanding.	
My	second	reason	for	thinking	that	predictive	competence	precedes	curative	is	
logical	rather	than	historical	in	character.	The	ability	to	cure	depends	upon	the	
ability	to	predict,	but	not	vice	versa.	If	one	claims	to	have	a	cure,	then	one	is	
making	a	prediction	about	what	will	happen	if	one’s	cure	is	administered.	Thus	
the	ability	to	cure,	or	at	least	to	do	so	deliberately,	depends	on	the	ability	to	
predict	what	will	happen	when	one	administers	the	cure.	
In	addition	to	predicting	outcomes,	the	ability	to	make	good	counterfactual	
predictions	is	central	to	the	ability	to	cure.	One	needs	to	be	able	to	say,	not	only	
what	will	happen	when	the	cure	is	administered,	but	also	what	would	have	
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happened	if	the	cure	had	not	been	administered.	At	the	point	of	decision,	this	is	
identical	to	predicting	what	will	happen	if	the	cure	is	not	administered.	The	
common	cold	typically	lasts	about	three	days.	On	the	first	day,	one	falls	ill.	On	the	
second,	one	starts	with	Vitamin	C.	Come	the	third,	one	is	on	the	mend.	It	is	easy	
to	attribute	this	to	the	Vitamin	C,	an	attribution	that	one	undoubtedly	ought	to	
question	when	reminded	that	would	be	on	the	mend	even	if	one	had	not	taken	
the	vitamin.	Thus	the	ability	to	cure,	or	at	least	to	do	so	knowingly,	requires	the	
ability	to	make	predictions	about	what	would	have	happened	had	one	not	
administered	the	cure.	
Conclusion	
The	core	competence	of	medicine	is	not	to	cure,	but	to	understand	and	to	predict	
the	course	of	health	and	disease.	This	is	not,	and	is	not	intended	as,	a	complete	
answer	to	the	question	I	started	with,	namely,	“What	is	medicine?”	There	are	
other	things	to	understand:	the	nature	of	disease	and	of	health,	in	particular.	
Substantial	literatures	already	exist	on	the	nature	of	disease	and	health.	But	little	
has	been	written	about	what	characteristic	skills	that	doctors	have,	or	are	
supposed	to	have.	
The	purpose	of	medicine	may	be	to	cure	the	sick,	yet	the	practical	skill	that	we	
require	our	doctors	to	have	is	not	to	cure	the	sick,	but	to	foretell	their	fates.	A	
person	without	any	prognostic	abilities	will	be	supposed	to	lack	diagnostic	
abilities,	and	thus	to	lack	understanding.	A	person	who	cannot	cure	may	still	
earn	a	living	as	a	doctor,	provided	they	can	show	that	they	understand	the	
malady,	if	not	in	full	then	at	least	much	better	than	the	layperson.	But	a	person	
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who	apparently	lacks	understanding	of	sickness	is	no	kind	of	medical	expert.	
Conversely,	a	person	who	has	happened	upon	a	cure	or	two	is	not	thereby	a	
doctor,	nor	a	specialist	in	the	conditions	in	question,	even	if	the	cures	are	
effective.		
The	importance	I	have	argued	we	should	place	on	understanding	as	a	goal	of	
medicine	allows	for	a	different	view	of	medicine	from	the	one	that	dominates	
health	policy	discourse	at	present.	That	view	is	obsessed	with	health	outcomes,	
and	makes	medicine	a	thoroughly	practical	discipline.	The	Evidence	Based	
Medicine	movement	is	the	strongest	expression	of	this	stance	(Howick	2011).	
Evidence	Based	Medicine	has	done	good	in	the	profession,	but	it	has	done	harm	
too.	It	denigrates	“bench	science”	in	favour	of	trials	aimed	at	establishing	
effectiveness.	In	doing	so,	it	has	proceeded	in	apparent	ignorance	of	the	fact	that	
the	strategy	of	Mainstream	Medicine,	obtaining	detailed	pathological	knowledge	
and	then	using	this	to	develop	treatments,	has	been	incredibly	successful,	and	is	
largely	responsible	for	the	most	dramatic	medical	successes.	
Looking	ahead,	Evidence	Based	Medicine	risks	enforcing	a	kind	of	medical	
positivism,	one	which	emphasises	evidence	for	effectiveness	above	all	else,	
including	theoretical	knowledge.	But	there	is	value	in	understanding	too.	This	
value	may	come	from	the	ability	to	develop	new	treatments,	but	it	may	also	come	
from	the	fact	that	we	want	our	medicine	to	be	able	to	explain	what	is	wrong	with	
us	as	well	as	to	cure	us.	Medicine	is	not	a	purely	practical	enterprise:	it	is	an	
intellectual	enterprise	too.	This	fact	is	evident	in	other	medical	traditions,	but	is	
in	danger	of	being	lost	in	the	extremely	robust,	and	often	downright	horrible,	
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discourse	that	increasingly	characterises	foundational	discussions	within	
Mainstream	Medicine.	
If	the	central	practical	competence	of	medicine	is	prediction,	then	this	also	
provides	a	new	way	to	approach	increasingly	unpleasant	debates	between	those	
who	advocate	Mainstream	Medicine	at	the	expense	of	every	other	medical	
tradition,	and	those	who	see	a	place	for	plurality.	Predictions	are	things	we	can	
test.	Rather	than	misguidedly	testing	the	efficacy	of	herbs	that	were	never	
intended	to	have	pharmacological	action	in	the	first	place	(for	example),	one	
might	seek	to	test	the	prognostic	abilities	of	a	sangoma,	or	a	homeopath.	There	
has	been	research	into	the	effectiveness	of	non‐Mainstream	interventions.	
However	I	do	not	know	of	any	empirical	research	into	the	predictive	abilities	of	
non‐Mainstream	practitioners,	and	indeed	not	a	great	deal	into	the	predictive	
abilities	of	Mainstream	medics	either.	
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